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Geoffrey D. Callaghan*

Intervenors at the Supreme Court
of Canada

My aim in this paper is to offer a normatively attractive and explanatorily sound
interpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to third party intervention.
The crux of my interpretation is that the policy the Court has developed on
intervenors allows it to strike a reasonable balance among a number of competing
democratic considerations, all of which have value in the context of judicial decision
making. In this respect, the Court should be commended for identifying a way to
liberalize a practice that possesses many democratically-attractive features, but
also the inherent capacity to undermine the democratic standing of the Court. I
buttress my argument against early literature on the subject, and use more recent
works by Ian Brodie and Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green as argumentative
foils.
Mon but dans cet article est d’offrir une interprétation normative attrayante et
explicative de l’approche de la Cour suprême du Canada en matière d’intervention
des tiers. L’essentiel de mon interprétation est que la politique que la Cour a
élaborée à l’égard des intervenants lui permet d’établir un équilibre raisonnable
entre un certain nombre de considérations démocratiques concurrentes, qui ont
toutes une valeur dans le contexte du processus décisionnel judiciaire. À cet
égard, il convient de féliciter la Cour d’avoir trouvé une façon de libéraliser une
pratique qui possède de nombreuses caractéristiques attrayantes sur le plan
démocratique, mais en même temps la capacité inhérente de miner la position
démocratique de la Cour. J’étaye mon argument contre la littérature ancienne sur
le sujet, et j’utilise les travaux plus récents de Ian Brodie et de Benjamin Alarie et
Andrew Green comme contrepoids argumentatif.

*
Instructor, Laurier University, Law and Society Program. Thanks to Kim Brooks for her incisive
comments on earlier drafts of the paper. The usual caveats apply.
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Introduction
Over the past few decades, intervenor participation has become a routine
part of the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) hearing process. Since 2000,
the percentage of appeals featuring at least one intervenor factum has not
dropped below 35 per cent (in 2001), and was on average 55 per cent.1
What is more, the presence of intervenors appears to be trending upward:
the last four years (2015–2018) have been marked by a 63 per cent rate
of intervenor participation, with the total number of intervening parties
during that period sitting at 1009 (an average of 252 per year).2 This
1.
The numbers from 2000–2008 can be found at Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Interventions
at the Supreme Court of Canada: Accuracy, Afliation, and Acceptance” (2010) 48:3&4 Osgoode Hall
LJ 381 at 396. I have personally compiled the numbers for the years 2009–2018, which were accessed
through LexisNexis and the Supreme Court of Canada website, online: <www.scc-csc.ca> [perma.
cc/8JV6-9QQF].
The relevant statistics from 2009–2018 are as follows:
2009: 37 of 62 appeals (60 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2010: 39 of 67 appeals (58 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2011: 37 of 66 appeals (56 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2012: 46 of 75 appeals (61 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2013: 45 of 73 appeals (62 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2014: 46 of 78 appeals (59 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2015: 41 of 66 appeals (62 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2016: 31 of 56 appeals (55 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2017: 42 of 64 appeals (66 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2018: 40 of 60 appeals (67 per cent) featured at least one intervenor.
2.
319 intervening parties made submissions in 2018; 222 intervening parties made submissions in
2017; 177 made submissions in 2016; 291 made submissions in 2015.
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represents a signicant increase from the 1641 that participated between
2000 and 2008 (an average of 182 per year).3
Based on these numbers, one would think the SCC would be relatively
transparent about its views on intervention. A practice as deeply entrenched
in the procedural makeup of the Court should be a prime candidate for its
reective scrutiny. But the opposite is the case. We have little information
about the role the justices at the SCC think intervenors play in its
adjudicative process, and the information we do have is conicting.4 This
state of affairs is troubling for a few reasons, most notably because the
question of whether, when, and which third parties ought to be granted
leave to intervene at the highest judicial level remains unsettled. Some
have suggested that interventions further entrench what Morton and
Knopff disparagingly call “the Court party”5—a coalition that “represents
a horizontal transfer of power to a new elite, not a vertical transfer of
power to the people.”6 Others view interventions in a more positive light,
arguing that they allow the SCC to increase its democratic legitimacy and
safeguard the independence it enjoys from the wider political sphere at the
same time.7 Which of these interpretations is the more plausible depends
largely on the way the practice is understood and used by the Court, and
because the legitimacy of the Court is bound up in the answer we accept,
it is no small matter that a genuine attempt be made to hit on the right one.
This paper argues that the policy the Supreme Court has adopted on
intervention is democratically appropriate. Given that the practice has the
3.
Alarie, supra note 1 at 398.
4.
Compare, for instance, Beverley McLachlin’s suggestion that “it’s only just and fair that we
allow those [who will be affected by our decisions] to present their viewpoints.” The statement was
made during an interview with Luiza Chwialkowska, “Rein in lobby groups, senior judges suggest,”
National Post (6 April 2000), online: <www.fact.on.ca/news/news0004/np000406.htm> [perma.cc/
CZ5J-R5KF]) with a recent Notice to the Profession reminding intervenors that “the purpose of an
intervention is to provide relevant submissions that will be useful to the Court and different from those
of the other parties”: Supreme Court of Canada, Notice to the Profession “Allotting Time for Oral
Argument” (March 2017), online: Supreme Court of Canada <www.scc-csc.ca/ar-lr/notices-avis/1703-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/8H5U-MNJW] [Notice to Profession].
5.
This is expressly the position endorsed by Ian Brodie in his book Ian Brodie, Friends of the
Court: The Privileging of Interest Group Litigants in Canada (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2002).
6.
F L Morton, “The Charter Revolution and the Court Party” (1992) 30:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 627 at
649.
7.
Jillian Welch, “No Room at the Top: Interest Group Intervenors and Charter Litigation in the
Supreme Court of Canada” (1985) 43:2 UT Fac L Rev 204; Philip Bryden, “Public Interest Intervention
in the Courts” (1987) 66:3 Can B Rev 490; Kenneth P Swan, “Intervention and Amicus Curiae Status
in Charter Litigation” in Robert J Sharpe, ed, Charter Litigation, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 27;
John Koch, “Making Room: New Directions in Third Party Intervention” (1990) 48:1 UT Fac L Rev
151; Sharon Lavine, “Advocating Values: Public Interest Intervention in Charter Litigation” (1992) 2
NJCL 27.
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capacity to both undermine and strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the
Court, the careful, and sometimes discordant, approach the Court employs
can be interpreted as an effective balancing of competing democratic
considerations, all of which have value in the context of judicial decisionmaking.
Before I engage the argument directly, a prefatory remark is in order.
As will soon become evident, my interpretation takes leave from those
who wrote on the subject early in the Charter era. As a result, one might
get the impression that my argument pertains only to cases that feature
a Charter challenge. While there is prima facie sense to a suggestion of
this kind—a few former Supreme Court Justices even having appeared
to accept some version of it8—there is no reason to think that it follows
directly. Although the Charter did present a clear opportunity for advocates
of intervention to discuss the democratic potential it held out, that potential
is in no strict sense tethered to the Charter. To the extent that the Court’s
decisions in non-Charter cases share the relevant features highlighted by
early arguments on the practice—in particular, that interests that stand to
be affected by those decisions may not be adequately represented by the
direct parties to the case—the same reasoning that pertains to the Court’s
decision-making in Charter cases pertains as well to its non-Charter
adjudication.
The article proceeds as follows. In part I, I outline the basis of early
arguments on intervention, drawing attention to what was perceived to be
a democracy decit facing the Court in the new Charter era. Part II details
the two prominent later conceptions of intervention—the rst offered
by Ian Brodie, the second by Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green—and
questions the viability of each as providing comprehensive answers to the
Court’s fuller approach to the practice. Part III offers a critique of those
later accounts by proposing an alternative, which I construct largely from
the democratic concerns that fueled earlier contributions to the literature.
As mentioned above, my suggestion is that intervention is a mechanism
by which the Court may balance a number of competing democratic
considerations, none of which are more essential than any other in the
8.
In a 2000 interview with the National Post, Michel Bastarache J (1997–2008) contended that
“because of the fact that we have lived with the Charter for 18 years and we have a lot of experience in
interpreting the Charter...[t]here isn’t the same need there was in 1982 to obtain help from intervenors”
(Chwialkowska, supra note 4). Later that same year, in an interview with the Globe and Mail, Frank
Iacobucci J (1991–2004) expressed the same sentiment: “...it’s now getting on to be 18 years or so
later. Should we be looking at the question [of intervenor participation] in different ways?” (Kirk
Makin, “Intervenors: How Many Are Too Many?,” The Globe and Mail (10 March 2000), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/intervenors-how-many-are-too-many/article1037654/>
[perma.cc/Z5ED-X643]).
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context of judicial decision-making. In this respect, the Court should be
commended for cultivating an approach to intervention that is sensitive to
both the nature of its own institutional responsibilities and to democratic
shortcomings the practice can help to address.
I. Early writings on intervention
Although a handful of authors wrote on intervention in the pre-Charter
era,9 a relative explosion occurred around the time the British Parliament
agreed to a proposal by the Canadian government that a Charter of Rights
and Freedoms be incorporated into the Canadian Constitution. The surge
can be traced to a few different sources,10 but none were as obvious as the
modied role the Court would take on as a result of that constitutional
moment. Generally speaking, judicial bodies are thought to serve either
one of two functions in the wider political order: the rst is an adjudicative
function, where the task is to resolve conicts between disputing parties
by invoking a set of established legal norms and applying them to the
case at hand; the second is an oversight function, where they are asked
to review government action to ensure that it is in compliance with the
constitutional commitments of a polity. While it would be misleading
to suggest that Canadian courts only discharged the rst function in the
pre-Charter era, the authority they would enjoy under the second was
signicantly enhanced post-Charter. Peter Russell explains the shift in
constitutional focus following the Charter’s enactment:
Whereas [prior to the Charter] the courts in assessing constitutionality
focused almost exclusively on the division of powers between the two
levels of government, [in the post-Charter era] they are at least equally
concerned with the constitutional rights of citizens against both levels
of government. The consequences of nding legislation unconstitutional
because it violates an individual’s constitutional rights would appear
to be more drastic than nding legislation unconstitutional because it
violates the federal division of powers. The former means that, unless
the constitution is amended, no government may legislate in the
proscribed area, whereas with the latter, what is excluded from one level
of government will normally be within the jurisdiction of the other.11

9.
See Paul Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto:
Methuen, 1974); Bernard M Dickens, “A Canadian Development: Non Party Intervention” (1977)
40 Mod L Rev 666; James V West, Public Interest Groups and the Judicial Process in Canada: The
Need for a More Realistic Jurisprudence (Thesis Dissertation, Carleton University, 1979).
10. I am thinking in particular of the changes that had been introduced in the mid-1970s in respect of
the composition of the Court, as well as to the standards by which it would operate. For more on these
changes see Brodie, supra note 5 at 25-28.
11. Peter H Russell, “The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian
Courts” (1982) 25:1 Can Pub Ad 1 at 14.
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The decision to constitutionalize a rights document had the effect of
signicantly broadening the scope of the judicial oversight function. Not
only would that function be to oversee (and resolve) constitutional disputes
between the federal and provincial governments, but also it would extend
to overseeing (and resolving) those disputes as they arose between the
government and the individual citizen. This in turn greatly enhanced the
ability of the courts to inuence policy-related decisions. By having the
power to invalidate a policy initiative undertaken by the government—
specically through a declaration that it stood in violation of an individual’s
(or group’s) Charter right—courts could issue determinations not only on
which level of government had the authority to implement that initiative
but also on the acceptability of the initiative itself. This was so even if a
judicial determination stood contrary to the will of the provincial and/or
federal legislatures.12
Naturally this transfer of political power caused an uproar in the legal
community. While proponents celebrated the fact that minority groups
would no longer be subject to the excessive forces of majority sentiment,
critics denounced the move as an affront to democracy. Their concern was
that because the will of the people could be usurped by the opinions of
a few elite judges, the decision-making of the courts could no longer be
considered democratically legitimate.
It was as a response to this concern that a number of authors began to
focus their attention on the merits of intervention. The structure of their
arguments rested on two complementary claims. The descriptive claim,
just reviewed in some detail, was that the Canadian political landscape
was fundamentally altered by the Charter in a way that would allow the
decisions of the courts to have a more profound and enduring inuence.
The prescriptive claim was that a shift in the procedure by which the courts
rendered their decisions was not only appropriate, but imperative.
There is little doubt as to the validity of the descriptive claim. Section
52 of the Charter provides that the Constitution has legal supremacy
over all other law making devices in Canada,13 and section 24 identies
12. One important aspect in the debate over the legitimacy of the Canadian version of judicial
review invokes s 33 of the Charter (‘the notwithstanding clause’) which holds that “Parliament or
the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the
case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in
section 2 or sections 7 to 15.” This provision, at least facially, seems to preserve ultimate authority
over law-making in Canada in Parliament (or the legislature of a province). I will not engage this
debate here, except to note that many scholars consider s 33 to be at best a nominal feature of the
Charter, both sparingly used and politically hazardous.
13. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 52, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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the judiciary as the relevant authority to determine whether a particular
constitutional right has been infringed or denied.14 These devices together
establish the kind of power discussed above: the Court has the authority to
declare any law or government action to be “of no force and effect,” which
in turn increases the inuence the Court has over the political landscape.15
There is good reason to think the prescriptive claim is defensible as
well. Although the notion of democracy is notoriously difcult to pin down,
it requires a level of responsiveness on the part of a decision-making body
to the will (or interests) of those who will be affected by its decisions. In
this respect, democratic decision-making aligns closely with the idea of
popular sovereignty, which holds that “the will of the people is distinct
from and superior to the ordinary actions of government.”16 This presents
a problem for judicial decision-making since courts are for the most part
unelected and, in some senses at least, unaccountable to the public for
the decisions they make. Framed in the context of the descriptive claim
then—namely, that under the constitutionalization of a charter of rights
many of those decisions will have direct ramications over policy-related
matters—the problem becomes acute. Given that questions of policy are
inherently open to debate—being, as Robert Dahl says, “an effective
choice among alternatives about which there is, at least initially, some
uncertainty”17— placing judicial bodies in a position where they have the
power to unilaterally resolve such questions seems to undermine notions
of popular sovereignty, and in turn the wider commitments of a democratic
polity.
The public stake in the outcome of judicial decisions generated
commentary on intervention as a procedural mechanism to ensure the
voices of those affected by the court’s decision might be heard. As Philip
Bryden noted in an article written around that time, just as “politicians,
government departments, and administrative agencies have created a wide
range of formal and informal mechanisms for consulting those who are
most substantially affected by their decisions,” intervention holds out the
14. Ibid, s 24.
15. The argument I am making here is of course not dependent on the existence of these provisions
in particular; nor is it dependent on the constitutionalization of a charter of rights. The point is simply
that the introduction of the Charter, and especially the powers outlined by ss 52 and 24, gave early
writers on intervention an explicit and stable target to frame their democratically-inspired concerns.
16. Kurt T Lash, “Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis” (2007) 93:6 Va
L Rev 1437 at 1444. For more on the connection between democracy and popular sovereignty,
see Andreas Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power” (2005) 12:2
Constellations 223.
17. Robert A Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker” (1957) 6:2 J Pub L 279 at 279.
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same kind of promise for judicial bodies.18 What it provides, Alan Borovoy
added, is a means by which “larger sectors of the community [will] be
able to participate in the process which produces those decisions,”19
offering the judiciary a way to countenance the democratic concerns the
Charter seems to invoke. Of course, none of this is to say that these writers
advocated that courts become Royal Commission-type bodies or that they
issue determinations on the basis of popular sentiment alone. They merely
suggested that courts should be willing to hear from those who stand
to be affected by some judicial decision, with the aim of addressing the
democracy decit that might ow from the Court’s new role under the
Charter.
II. More recent contributions to the literature
The two studies that explicitly focus on the Court’s use of intervention in
the years following the post-Charter upsurge are those produced by Ian
Brodie (in his book Friends of the Court) and Benjamin Alarie and Andrew
Green (in their article “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada”).
Unlike the earlier contributions to the literature, these works enjoyed a
certain distance from the original “experimenting” the Court did with the
practice, and in this respect are more grounded in empirical reasoning than
earlier contributions. Nevertheless, the picture of intervention advanced
by each work ends up being highly divergent. What led to the disparity? In
what follows, I begin by looking at the paper by Alarie and Green (which
is the more empirically-grounded of the two), and then at the theory
developed by Ian Brodie (which paints a negative picture of the Court’s
use of interventions).
1. Alarie and Green: the service interpretation
Alarie and Green begin their examination by positing three candidate
rationales that could account for the Court’s policy on intervention—
rationales they call “accuracy, afliation, and acceptance.” The “accuracy
rationale” maintains that the information provided by intervening parties
“will increase the probability that an optimal disposition of the appeal will
be reached.”20 On this rationale, intervenors are considered valuable to the
extent that the Court can derive some assistance from them in executing its
decision-making function. The “afliation rationale,” on the other hand,
takes an instrumental perspective of intervenors, seeing them as a means
18. Bryden, supra note 7 at 506.
19. Alan Borovoy, “Interventions and the Public Interest (Open Letter to the Supreme Court of
Canada)” in FL Morton, ed, Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in Canada, 3rd ed (Calgary:
University of Calgary Press, 2002) at 290.
20. Alarie, supra note 1 at 386.
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by which Justices may “vote directly in accordance with their [policy]
preferences.”21 Here, the value of intervenors is the cover they provide for
what might be considered a neglect of the Court’s function. Finally, the
“acceptance rationale” holds that intervenor participation is a way that the
Court can “promote the acceptance of [its] decisions through increased
legitimacy.”22
In order to arrive at the likeliest candidate to explain the Court’s
behaviour, the authors use two highly speculative methods of analysis
based on the voting patterns that particular judges (and the Court as a
whole) have developed over time. Since the acceptance rationale “would
have required there to be no statistically signicant relationship between
the presence of intervenors (or particular types of intervenors) and the
decision-making of the Court or particular judges”23 (which there was);
and since “liberal or conservative judges are not particularly affected by
intervenors with similar policy inclinations”24 (which cuts against the
presuppositions of the afliation rationale), the authors deduce that “the
Court...appears to be using interventions to better understand the impacts
of its decisions.”25 In other words, the conclusion the authors reach is
that the accuracy rationale provides the best explanation for the liberal
approach the Court has adopted in granting leave to interveners.
Even if the many inferences Alarie and Green rely on to arrive at this
conclusion are accepted, two problems remain. The rst relates to how
the authors choose to frame their inquiry. Alarie and Green invoke data
related exclusively to how intervention has affected the decision-making
habits of Supreme Court Justices.26 This would indicate that the relevant
question to be answered is not “why has the Court taken the particular tack
it has on intervention?” but rather “how has the presence of intervening
parties affected the decision-making of judges?” The latter is a perfectly
legitimate question on its own (a number of comparable studies in the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Ibid at 389.
Ibid.
Ibid at 408.
Ibid at 408-409.
Ibid at 410.
Ibid at 391.
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U.S.27 and elsewhere28 have been designed on the basis of this question
specically); but more importantly, it is a conceptually distinct question
from the one the authors claim to address in their paper.29 We can see this
most clearly if we consider the different epistemic states that follow from
each inquiry. Judges may only obscurely be aware of the effect intervening
parties have over their voting behavior (the latter question), but they would
surely be cognizant of their reasons for granting leave to such parties (the
former question). For this reason, there is cause to challenge whether the
purported target of Alarie and Green’s study is in fact the appropriate one.
What is more, there is a worry about how the accuracy rationale
itself should be interpreted. Sometimes the authors describe the accuracy
rationale in terms of “objectively useful information to the Court”30 from
which the Court may produce “a better or more accurate decision;”31 in other
cases the focus shifts to “the impacts of the decision on parties not before
the court,”32 particularly in the service of increasing “the probability that
an optimal disposition of the appeal will be reached.”33 These two senses
of how intervenors may improve the accuracy of the Court’s decisions
can be pulled apart, and this muddies the waters with respect to the
conclusion the authors defend. On the former description, the impression
is that the information intervenors provide can be used to improve the
objective nature of the Court’s decisions, allowing it to dispense more
accurate judgments “in the manner most consistent with the aims of the
statute or case law as a whole.”34 On the latter description, there is at least
a possibility that the nature of the information provided by intervenors will
be used more expansively—in the vein, for instance, of giving the Court
an indication of the subjective impact its decision will have over various
27. See Paul M Collins, Jr, Pamela C Corley & Jesse Hammer, “The Inuence of Amicus Curiae
Briefs on US Supreme Court Opinion Content” (2015) 49:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 917; Paul M Collins,
Jr, “Lobbying Before the US Supreme Court: Investigating the Inuence of Amicus Curiae Briefs”
(2007) 60:1 Pol Research Q 55; Paul M Collins, Jr, “Friends of the Court: Examining the Inuence
of Amicus Curiae Participation in US Supreme Court Litigation” (2004) 38:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 807;
Joseph D Kearney & Thomas W Merrill, “The Inuence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme
Court” (2000) 148:3 U Pa L Rev 743.
28. See Lorne Neudorf, “Intervention at the UK Supreme Court” (2013) 2:1 Cambridge J Int’l &
Comp L 16; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, “Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO”
(2001) 7 Widener L Symp J 82; George Williams, “The Amicus Curiae and Intervenor in the High
Court of Australia: A Comparative Analysis” (2000) 28:3 Fed L Rev 365.
29. While there is some variability to the way Alarie and Green frame their study, their interest at
bottom appears to be what their “results tell [them] about...why the Court may allow interventions”
(Alarie, supra note 1 at 408).
30. Alarie, supra note 1 at 383.
31. Ibid at 386.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid at 388.
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non-implicated parties to the proceeding. So while the accuracy rationale
can certainly be reduced to what Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill
have called the “legal model of judicial decision-making”35—a reduction
Alarie and Green appear ready to accept36—there is no reason to think
that it must. On its face at least, the rationale can apply to both a legalistic
conception of judicial decision-making, and to a conception that is more
open to policy-responsiveness on the part of the Court. Quite probably, it is
a rationale that is best explained as involving a blend of both—especially
when the common law framework the Court uses to render its judgments is
factored in. And while it is perfectly acceptable to adopt a composite view
of how the Court receives information that is provided by intervenors,
it is also something that ought to be addressed if the aim is to advance a
normative understanding of the Court’s approach to the practice.
I explain in short order the fuller rationale behind this assertion, but
before I do, I describe the competing account Ian Brodie advances in his
book on intervention, as it relies quite heavily on the distinction Alarie and
Green eschew in their paper.
2. Brodie: the strategic interpretation
Brodie’s explanation for why the SCC has taken the tack it has on
intervention arises from the same post-Charter tension that fueled much
of the early writing on the subject. Unlike the favourable assessment those
authors offered, Brodie is more hostile to the practice. At the center of his
assessment is a ‘“conundrum” he claims the Court faced in the light of
the increased policy-making role it took on as the nal arbiter of rights
claims—one that forced it to choose between either (1) “the legalistic
argument,” which holds that “courts do not make law when they interpret
the Constitution [but are rather] engaged in a mechanical process of
‘discovering’ principles of constitutional law that already exist in the
document itself,”37 or (2) “the political disadvantage theory,”38 which
holds that without the protection of a superior adjudicative body operating
above the fray of majoritarian politics, the rights belonging to historically
disadvantaged groups are vulnerable to being trenched upon. In response
to this conundrum, Brodie explains the Court’s approach to intervention
as strategically motivated:
Why did the Court adopt the position of lobbyists so decisively?….It is
important to recall the broader background to this development. During
35.
36.
37.
38.

Kearney, supra note 29.
Alarie, supra note 1 at 387-388.
Brodie, supra note 5 at 59.
Ibid at ch 1.
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the early and mid-1980s the Supreme Court used its power of judicial
review more actively than it ever had before. It staked out bold new
ground using the Charter, placing no signicant limits on its own powers
to review government actions and replace the judgment of government
ofcials with its own. No court can do such a thing for long without
the support of political interests. Just as the Trudeau government found
civil liberties and rights oriented groups useful allies for legitimating its
patriation project, so the Supreme Court found these groups to be useful
allies in legitimating its extraordinary activism. By accommodating
interest groups, the Court blunted their potentially damaging criticism.
Allying itself with ‘disadvantaged groups’ furthermore provided a
justication for what otherwise might appear to be an unconscionable
power grab.39

Brodie interprets the SCC’s decision to liberalize the practice of intervention
as a means by which it could bolster the legitimacy of its activist turn.
Because the only available justication for the “unconscionable power
grab” the Court initiated in the post-Charter era was to draw attention to
its role as “defender of disadvantaged groups,” it was thereby impelled to
win the support of those groups, which it ultimately did by capitulating to
pleas that the practice of intervention be made more accessible.
Brodie’s analysis emerges from a particular way of interpreting
the historical circumstances around the Court’s decision to liberalize
the practice of intervention. Earlier arguments drew attention to the
democratic appropriateness of the Court adopting a more liberal approach
to the practice; in contrast, Brodie suggests that the Court’s decision is
explained by a questionable anti-democratic agenda. His claim is that by
choosing to increase interest group involvement in its decision-making
process, the Court at best substituted the will of the Canadian people for a
discrete and insular sample of it (what I will call “the weaker iteration” of
Brodie’s narrative), and at worst erected a smokescreen by which it could
conceal its policy-making activities from the wider population (what I will
call “the stronger iteration” of that narrative). Both of these allegations are
troubling and, if true, present ample reason to question just how viable the
Court’s increasingly liberal approach to intervention really is.40
I suggest an alternative that puts the historical record on which Brodie
relies in a more sympathetic light. This requires focusing on three aspects

39. Ibid at 47-48.
40. Of note is that Brodie remains agnostic on which of these iterations is more credible. His ofcial
position is that: “By importing the concept of disadvantaged groups into its jurisprudence, [the Court]
gained those groups as allies. Whether this maneuver was deliberate or the inadvertent byproduct of
the Court’s decisions, the rhetoric of the disadvantaged group insulates the Court from criticisms of its
activism.” (Ibid at xvii).
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of Brodie’s story in more detail. For the rst, I return to why Alarie and
Green’s use of the accuracy rationale is not as straightforward as presented.
Although it is of course possible that, as the authors claim, the Court uses
intervention primarily to improve the accuracy of its decision-making,
I earlier highlighted an equivocation that surfaces when applying that
rationale in the context of judicial decisions. The question was whether the
information provided by intervenors should be thought to contribute to (1)
the Court’s ability to render a more accurate legal judgement, understood
from the point of view of legal principles; or instead as contributing to (2)
its ability to deliver a better legal judgment, understood from the point
of view of the ramications the judgment will have for stakeholders. It
is this very distinction that Brodie seems to embrace as the grounding
insight for his negative assessment of the Court’s use of intervention.
His work suggests that if the Court were really committed to restricting
its role to (1)—what he calls “the legalistic argument”—there would be
little reason to allow intervenor participation at all. His suggestion is that
“[a]n adjudicative court can depend on the [litigating] parties to bring any
relevant information to its attention,”41 and that any information that might
“slip through the cracks” will be caught by “the services of a reasonably
competent bar and clerks.”42 On the other hand, if the Court were to take a
broader view of its place in the political order—one that accepts its role as
policy-maker, for instance—it could not similarly “trust the parties to the
case to bring forward all the types of information that it needs.”43 Instead,
and for the reasons outlined by early writers on the subject, it would have
to rely on the same range of procedural resources that are available to
more typical policy-making bodies (e.g., committee hearings, fact nding
missions, etc.).
Brodie’s line of reasoning on this score captures well my reservations
about the reliability of the conclusion reached by Alarie and Green. The
distinction that seems to be operating in the background of what they call
“the accuracy rationale” calls into question just how robustly that rationale
can be used toward a meaningful assessment of the Court’s approach to
the practice. One would think, for example, that a court that believes
intervenors serve it in the legalistic sense depicted by (1) would restrict
access to only those parties whose intervening briefs could be said to
introduce new and useful information to the legal dispute in question, as
well as prohibit intervening parties from straying even minimally from
41.
42.
43.

Ibid at 53.
Ibid at 61.
Ibid at 54.
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the core of that dispute. A court that believed intervenors serve it in the
canvassing way depicted by (2), on the other hand, would be far more
open to any kind of intervening submission, provided of course that it
did not deviate too widely from the issue at hand. As a matter of fact, the
SCC’s rules and conduct concerning intervention betray elements of both
tendencies, and this undermines the value we can glean from Alarie and
Green’s blanket conclusion that the Court uses intervention as a means
to arrive at more accurate decisions. Unless we can distinguish the sense
in which a decision is understood to be “accurate” in the rst place, the
conclusion the authors reach tells us little about whether the specic way
the practice is being implemented is a genuine reection of the Court’s
aims.
So there are problems with embracing Alarie and Green’s assessment
as it stands. A convincing account of why the accuracy rationale is the
likeliest candidate to explain the Court’s approach to intervention would
at the very least require a more thorough discussion of what it implies.
But Alarie and Green’s study does give us reason to reject the stronger
iteration of Brodie’s narrative, which is that the Court uses intervention
as a cover to implement its own policy-making agenda. As the authors
convincingly explain, for the stronger iteration of Brodie’s narrative to be
true one would expect to see the voting patterns of partisan judges align
with intervening submissions of the same general type. In other words:
“if...in cases involving liberal intervenors, a liberal judge tends to have a
higher liberal voting percentage than in other cases, it may be evidence...
that the liberal judges are receiving information that accords with their
policy preferences...”44 But this is simply not the case. The results of
Alarie and Green’s research indicate rather “that liberal or conservative
judges (as measured by the party of the appointing prime minister or by
the judge’s ideal point score) are not particularly affected by intervenors
with similar policy inclinations,”45 and this strongly suggests that there
is no veiled intent behind the Court’s approach to or use of intervenor
participation.
So there are challenges with accepting the stronger iteration of
Brodie’s narrative as well. But these same considerations cannot be used to
repudiate the weaker version of that narrative, which is that by embracing
a policy-making role at all, the SCC risks a legitimacy crisis.46 The way

44. Alarie, supra note 1 at 392.
45. Ibid at 409.
46. Brodie writes: “the Court cannot [both] admit its political role [and avoid] a loss in its legitimacy.”
(Brodie, supra note 5 at 51).
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Brodie frames this weaker iteration is to place it in the context of interest
group–Court relations, his suggestion being that the Court’s acquiescence
to certain left-leaning groups early in the Charter era has resulted in a
stratied, and thus undemocratic, inuence within that particular decisionmaking arena.47 On this weaker iteration, intervention is not viewed as a
cover by which the Court executes its own policy-making agenda, but as a
means by which special interest groups—specically those that promote a
liberal agenda—can utilize the Court to execute theirs.
If this weaker version of Brodie’s narrative is indicative of the way
the Court has designed its approach to intervention, it would be just as
problematic as the stronger version. However, there is reason to question
its viability. To ground his argument, Brodie cites a trilogy of cases48
(where leave was granted by one intervenor-friendly justice Sopinka) and
four other cases49 to demonstrate the unwillingness of the Court to apply
the same rules to their conservative counterparts. Choosing such a small
sample risks skewed results. What is more, when one takes a broader
view of the facts around which groups have and have not been granted
leave to intervene, the position Brodie advocates turns out to be baseless.
According to Alarie and Green’s research,50 for example, from 2000 to
2008 no discrete group suffered a success rate at obtaining leave below
76 per cent, and most enjoyed a success rate in excess of 90 per cent.
And although school boards (100 per cent) and environmental groups (98
per cent) did enjoy the highest success rates of all, the next highest rate
(outside of attorneys general) belonged to government interests (97 per
cent)—scarcely a progressive faction. Furthermore, public interest groups
(87 per cent), unions (87 per cent), religious groups (87 per cent) and public
advocacy law (89 per cent)—all of which align across partisan lines—
enjoyed among the lowest rates of success, eclipsed only by individuals
(76 per cent). One can speculate as to why the Court treated each of these
groups as it did (both in the individual cases and as a general trend), but
the fuller numbers do not support the view that the Court privileges liberal

47. As Brodie writes: “it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Court plays favorites with interest
groups. Favored groups can intervene when they wish and bend cases to raise the issues they want
raised. Other groups have difculty getting in the door.” (ibid at 71).
48. Namely, Reference re Worker’s Compensation Act, 1983 (Nd) (Application to Intervene),
[1989] 2 SCR 335, [1989] SCJ No 113 (QL); M(K) v M(H), [1992] 3 SCR 3, 1991 CanLII 13 (SCC);
and, Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 224, 1991 CanLII 7424 (SCC).
49. Namely, Lavigne v Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 SCR 211, 81 DLR (4th)
545; R v Zundel, [1992] 2 SCR 731, 95 DLR (4th) 202; R v Finta, [1993] 1 SCR 1138, 1993 CanLII
132 (SCC); and, R v Morgentaler, [1993] 1 SCR 462, 1993 CanLII 158 (SCC).
50. The statistics can all be found at Alarie, supra note 1 at 399.
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intervenors over conservative ones. Instead, the evidence suggests that,
from a partisan standpoint, the Court is even with its grants of leave.
Brodie’s narrative on intervention seems to reect his more general
repudiation of the Court’s policy-making role under the Charter. But
whether the Court is justied in embracing this role is open to debate.
Brodie interprets the Court’s relationship to intervention as betraying
either deception (the stronger iteration) or partiality (the weaker iteration),
but there is another interpretation available that would view that
relationship in a more favourable light. Indeed, by using the same set of
facts upon which Brodie relies, one can imagine the Court’s intervention
decisions not as an attempt to legitimate its political activism, nor even as
a promotion of one partisan cause over another, but rather as an attempt to
strike the best or most reasonable balance among competing democratic
considerations. Too often Brodie’s narrative implies that the Court was
given a choice between the diametrically opposed roles of ‘legalistically’
interpreting existing law and ‘politically’ making new law, and that
whichever choice the Court embraced would preclude the other. But there
is no reason to think that these were the terms upon which that choice
was made. In theory, a wide spectrum exists between the two roles for a
constitutional court. Attempting to strike a reasonable balance between
those poles might appear to be an appropriate course for the Court to take,
especially considering the practical realities under which such courts are
bound to operate.
III. The democratic balancing interpretation
Though available to the Court as early as 1900,51 intervention was seldom
used as a procedural device until the mid-1970s when new rules that had
been applied to the Court52 precipitated a substantial shift in the Court’s
attitude toward the practice. In particular, a decision by the Trudeau
government to abolish the right of appeal clause for cases involving more
than $10,000 gave the Court far more control over its docket, which led
to an increasing focus on public law disputes.53 Between 1976 and 1982
thirty-ve non-government intervenors were granted leave to participate
in appeals before the SCC—a number that exceeded the total in the
category prior to that date.54 The trend continued in the rst two years

51. Martin L Friedland, A Century of Criminal Justice: Perspectives on the Development of
Canadian Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1984).
52. Russell, supra note 11 at 98-99.
53. For a good summary of this period in the Court’s relationship to intervenors see Brodie, supra
note 5 at 22-28.
54. Ibid at 27.
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of the Charter era—the Court granting an additional thirty-three parties
leave to intervene55—but took an unexpected turn after that. Instead of
expanding its approach to intervention further, or even adhering to the
same gradual pattern it had established over the prior decade, the Court
appeared to recoil from the practice altogether, allowing only nine nongovernment intervenors to participate in the crucial formative years of
1985 and 1986.56 It wasn’t until a court-appointed liaison committee,
specically assembled to investigate the matter, returned its report that
the number of intervenors began to increase again.57 The upshot of that
report, as committee chairman, Brian Crane, wrote in a memo at the time,
was that the Court ought to modify its rules on intervention “so that public
interest groups will have an opportunity to put forward their views.”58
From 1987 onwards intervenor participation increased at an impressive
rate—both in respect of the amount of applications led with the Court,
as well as the percentage of applicants granted leave59—and, as stated in
the Introduction, today nearly 60 per cent of appeals feature at least one
nongovernment intervenor, with the Court granting leave almost 90 per
cent of the time.
On its face, this record seems to support the weaker iteration of Brodie’s
narrative on intervention. After all, it was only subsequent to interest
group lobbying that the Court appeared interested in appointing a liaison
committee to investigate the matter,60 and this suggests that the catalyst for
that decision was specically to assuage interest group concern. But what
a general account of the events around intervention ignores are the many
nuances that attended each phase of this development, and these serve to
complicate Brodie’s story signicantly.
1. Incompatibility and disparity in the Court’s early actions on
intervention
Consider rst the noticeable incompatibility between the rules the Court
used to regulate the practice of admitting intervenors early in the post55. Ibid at 37.
56. Ibid.
57. Report of the Canadian Bar Association—Supreme Court of Canada Liaison Committee, 22
October 1986, vol 142, le 12.
58. More specically, the committee “reached a consensus that the rules should be modied to permit
written interventions, by leave of a judge, so that public interest groups will have the opportunity to
put forward their views in writing. Oral participation by intervenants should still be allowed in special
circumstances where the participation of an intervenant is especially important for the hearing of
the appeal.” (Brian Crane, “CBA Supreme Court of Canada Liaison Committee Mid-Winter Report”
(Paper delivered to the Canadian Bar Association’s Governing Council, February 1987)).
59. Brodie, supra note 5 at 37 table 2.1.
60. Ibid at 32-36.
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Charter period and the way it behaved on the basis of those rules. In 1983,
for example, after making no changes to the practice of intervention in
the previous 76 years,61 the Court instituted two new rules,62 one of which
gave parties that had intervened in a court below an immediate grant of
leave to appear before the SCC. This rule seemed to indicate a change
of approach for third party intervenors, perhaps even to the point where
they were considered an important feature of the SCC’s wider adjudicative
process. But the Court’s subsequent behavior did not bear this impression
out. Almost immediately after the rule came into effect, a modication
was issued by Ritchie J in Ogg-Moss v The Queen63 that excluded its
application to criminal proceedings, and this was followed a few weeks
later by a complete moratorium on the rule.64
A few years later, the Court once more adjusted the formal rules
around intervention, only this time in the direction of making them more
rigid.65 Two additions were introduced, the rst requiring that an applicant
state their interest in the appeal as well as the grounds “for believing that
the submissions will be useful to the Court and different from those of the
parties,”66 and the second imposing limits on both the length of intervening
factums (20 pages) and the conditions under which an intervening party
may make an oral argument (exclusively by judicial order).67 In reverse
fashion to the earlier change, these modications suggested that the Court
was interested in cutting down access to third party intervenors, viewing
their participation as more peripheral to its decision-making. Once again,
however, the Court’s subsequent behaviour did not bear this impression
out. After instituting these modications, the Court became increasingly
permissive with respect to intervenors, granting access to 88 per cent of
all nongovernment applications between 1987 and 1991,68 which is a trend
that has continued.
Consider next the disparity the Court demonstrated concerning which
parties were granted leave in the early Charter years, as well as the types
of cases in which intervenors were permitted.69 In Guerin v The Queen,
61. Ibid at 32.
62. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, amendment, SOR/1983-74: Rule 32 entitled attorneysgeneral to intervene in constitutional cases as of right, while Rule 18(2) extended that same entitlement
to nongovernment intervenors who had intervened in a court below.
63. Ogg-Moss v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 171, 1983 CanLII 139 (SCC).
64. Notice to the Profession, [1984] SCCB 24; Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, amendment,
SOR/1983-930.
65. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, amendment, SOR/87-292.
66. Ibid at r 18(3)(c).
67. Ibid at r 18(5).
68. Brodie, supra note 5 at 37.
69. Katherine Swinton goes so far to call the Court’s policy on intervention during this period
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a case about Indigenous treaty rights, Laskin CJ permitted the National
Indian Brotherhood to participate as an intervening party,70 but denied
leave to the Treaty 8 Trial Association.71 In Law Society of Upper Canada v
Skapinker, the rst Charter case to feature an intervenor application, Beetz
J granted leave to the Federation of Law Societies of Canada,72 but denied
it to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association73 (CCLA) in the second
case (R v Marlene Moore). Wilson J granted leave to various provincial
commissions74 in Canadian Human Rights Commission and Bhinder
v CNR but not to the Canadian Association of Provincial Judges in R v
Valente.75 Perhaps most strikingly, Dickson CJ denied leave to the Seventh
Day Adventist Church in one of the rst freedom of religion cases (R v Big
M Drug Mart),76 while Estey J denied leave to the CCLA in an important
freedom of expression case (Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation
Society v Ontario Board of Censors et al)77 and LeDain J denied leave to
both the Maritime Employers Association and Western Terminals Ltd in a
landmark freedom of association case (Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union Local 580 et al v Dolphin Delivery Ltd).78
These disparities of application suggest that the Court was using a
pigeon-hole approach to determine who was and was not t to intervene,
seeming once more to align with the strategic narrative defended by
Brodie. However, I want to suggest a different theory. My hypothesis is
that the uneven behaviour the SCC exhibited in the early Charter years is
not evidence of a predetermined agenda on its part, nor even of a Court
that lacked a sense of purpose with respect to the practice, but rather a
predictable, and even tting, response to an instrument that of its own
nature generates two important democratic concerns—the rst to do with
the procedural efciency of the Court, and the second with the Court’s
accountability to the public. When we factor in these considerations, an
“both erratic and arbitrary.” in Katherine E Swinton, The Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian
Federalism: The Laskin-Dickson Years (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 72. A fuller account of the history
is available in Welch, supra note 7 at 217-223.
70. Guerin v The Queen, [1983] SCCB 307 (motion for leave to intervene).
71. Guerin v The Queen, [1983] SCCB 323 (motion for leave to intervene).
72. Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker, [1983] SCCB 437 (motion for leave to intervene).
73. R v Marlene Moore, [1983] SCCB 439 (motion for leave to intervene).
74. Canadian Human Rights Commission and Bhinder v CNR, [1983] SCCB 756 (motion for leave
to intervene).
75. R v Valente, [1983] SCCB 837 (motion for leave to intervene).
76. R v Big M Drug Mart, [1984] SCCB 79 (motion for leave to intervene).
77. Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society v Ontario Board of Censors et al, [1984] SCCB
788 (motion for leave to intervene).
78. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union Local 580 et al v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1984]
SCCB 912 (motion for leave to intervene).
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equally plausible explanation for the Court’s unpredictable behaviour in
the early Charter years has less to do with justifying its new role as policymaker than it does with an attempt to strike a reasonable balance between
the conicting aspects internal to the practice of intervention itself.
2. Balancing democratic considerations
Consider rst how the incompatibility between the rules the Court instituted
on intervention and its subsequent behaviour could be interpreted as an
attempt to address certain democratic tensions inherent to the practice.
Jillian Welch suggests that the 1983 rule change that gave intervening
parties in lower courts immediate permission to intervene before the SCC
was likely instituted as a time-saving measure;79 Brodie offers a second
explanation, which is that the change was due to the Court’s uneasiness
with the policy-making role it had adopted as a consequence of the
Charter.80 These explanations are not incompatible in theory, as both allude
to the reservations the Court would have had concerning the inuence
intervention might carry over the efciency of its operating procedure. As
former Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court, Warren Burger, declared: if
condence in the court system is eroded, then condence in societal order
follows:
A sense of condence in the courts is essential to maintain the fabric
of ordered liberty for a free people and three things could destroy that
condence and do incalculable damage to society: that people come
to believe that inefciency and delay will drain even a just judgment
of its value; that people who have long been exploited in the smaller
transactions of daily life come to believe that courts cannot vindicate
their legal rights from fraud and over-reaching; that people come to
believe the law—in the larger sense—cannot fulll its primary function
to protect them and their families in their homes, at their work, and on
the public streets.81

The general thrust of Burger’s argument is that unless citizens can be
assured that justice will be administered in a timely and effective manner,
condence in the system will begin to wilt. And since democracy is more
or less based on the people’s enduring condence in the institutions that

79. Welch, supra note 7 at 216-217.
80. Brodie writes that: “[a]nother possible explanation [to Welch’s] is that the Court’s reluctance
to hear intervenors in these early Charter years also owed from its own conception of judicial
supremacy.” (supra note 5 at 59).
81. Warren E Burger, “What’s Wrong With the Courts: The Chief Justice Speaks Out” (1970) 69 US
News & World Report (Address to American Bar Association meeting, 10 August 1970).

Intervenors at the Supreme Court of Canada

53

govern them,82 a crisis in one could translate to a crisis in the other.83 In
this sense, it is only natural that the SCC would have taken a cautious,
and even a provisionary, attitude toward the rules around intervention
in the early Charter years. At the time, the Court would have been only
beginning to be aware of the implications intervention would have on both
its time and effectiveness, and thus a “learning phase,” where the Court
would try to discover the best or most efcient way to utilize that tool, was
to be both expected and desired.
The same kind of reasoning can be used to explain the disparity in how
the Court chose to administer grants of leave, only this time with respect to
the idea of accountability. The relationship between judicial accountability
and judicial independence is a complex one. Although there is truth to
the view that, as former Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin once noted,
“any system of accountability for judges must take judicial independence
as a necessary condition,”84 a rather deep tension lies at the core of each
concept. Judicial independence is about keeping the judiciary free of
any undue pressure from outsiders; judicial accountability is about the
judiciary’s ultimate responsibility to the public. The question is: how can a
judiciary free of any outside inuence ultimately be said to be accountable
to the public?
The answer lies in the instrumental value promoted by each concept—
both aim to ensure that the judiciary is beholden to the rule of law rather
than to its own, or to another’s, partisan agenda. This offers the salient
link between judicial accountability and judicial independence. Being
accountable to the public requires issuing decisions in a way that responds
to the function the judiciary is intended to serve in a liberal democratic
order. Discharging that function successfully is conditional on the
judiciary’s ability to apply the law impartially and fairly. This in turn
requires a degree of independence from the other branches of government
82. As Hannah Arendt reminds us, “it is the people’s support that lends power to the institutions
of a country” (Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, 1970) at 41). For a broad defense
of this general idea, see Sonja Zmerli, Kenneth Newton & Jose Ramon Montero, “Trust in People,
Condence in Political Institutions, and Satisfaction with Democracy” in Jan W van Deth, Jose
Ramon Montero & Anders Westholm, eds, Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A
Comparative Analysis (London: Routledge, 2007) at 35.
83. Beverley McLachlin CJ recently said as much, noting that “if people do not have condence in
the courts, they will not support them.” (Beverley McLachlin, “The Decline of Democracy and the Rule
of Law: How to Preserve the Rule of Law and Judicial Independence?” (Remarks at Saskatchewan
and Manitoba Courts of Appeal Joint Meeting, 28 September 2017), online: Supreme Court of Canada
<www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2017-09-28-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/V85T-RKZS]).
84. Beverly McLachlin, “Judicial Accountability” (Remarks at the Conference on Law and
Parliament, 2 November 2006), online: Supreme Court of Canada <www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/
spe-dis/bm-2006-11-02-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/7VBP-TPZ2].
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which, as elected bodies, are more likely to make decisions on the basis
of popular sentiment or interest group pressure. In this sense, as Stephen
Burbank has noted, the two concepts are but “different sides of the same
coin.”85
The relationship between judicial accountability and judicial
independence appears to challenge even the limited role intervenors might
serve in judicial proceedings, and this could well have played some part in
the uneven behaviour exhibited by the Court in the early Charter period.
The concern would have been that granting too many (or any) outside
parties participatory access to court proceedings was a slippery slope
toward undermining the impartiality of the Court, and this in turn would
have weakened the Court’s democratic responsibilities to the public from
an accountability standpoint. Chabot J’s strong words in the 1988 decision
Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Canada (A.G.) capture this concern: “[i]t is
fundamentally repugnant to this Court to import into judicial proceedings
even the concept of the legitimacy of judicial decisions, which in the end
could not but sap judicial authority in its most fundamental democratic
guarantee, the independence of the judiciary.”86 Just as the Court showed
unease in regulating the practice of interventions to ensure procedural
effectiveness, a degree of inconsistency was bound to surface in how it
dealt with intervening parties on a case-by-case basis. As its task was
to nd the best balance concerning a practice that possessed opposing
features to its own unique institutional responsibilities, a learning phase
was to be expected whereby the Court could come to better understand
how the relatively unknown practice of intervention would impact that
balance.
Interpreting the Court’s early actions around intervention as an
attempt to balance competing democratic considerations presents a viable
alternative to Brodie’s suggestion that the practice was used as a way to
legitimate the Court’s policy-making agenda. Where the interpretation
I have provided becomes especially compelling however is when we
consider it in the context of more recent Court behaviour, which I argue
reects a tension between the rules by which the practice of intervention
is designed and the practical way the Court has chosen to implement those
rules. My suggestion is that this tension makes better sense if conceived as
an exercise in democratic balancing.

85. Stephen B Burbank, “The Architecture of Judicial Independence” (1999) 72:2&3 S Cal L Rev
315 at 339.
86. Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Canada (AG), [1988] 55 DLR (4th) 555 at 571, 1988 CanLII 5719 (QC
CS).
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3. Rule creation versus rule application
Four rules have governed the practice of third party intervention for the
past several decades. Potential intervenors must:
(1) describe their interest in the proceeding, as well as any prejudice
they would suffer if their intervention were denied;87
(2) identify the position they wish to support with respect to the
proceeding, and explain how their submissions are uniquely
relevant to it;88
(3) not raise any new issues to the proceeding (unless otherwise
ordered by a judge);89 and
(4) not make any statement concerning the outcome of the appeal
(unless otherwise ordered by a judge).90
On paper, these rules set a high bar for being granted leave to intervene.
The rule that seems particularly onerous is the one that would have
intervening parties explain how their submissions are uniquely relevant
to the proceeding, coupled with a restriction on the opportunity to raise
any new issues. As Brodie explains in his book, one would think that
modern courts of law should be able to “depend on the parties to bring any
relevant information to its attention,”91 and thus that successful grants of
leave would be a rare occurrence. But precisely the opposite is the case.
Parties seeking leave to intervene are usually successful, and this implies
that either: (1) the vast majority of intervening submissions add something
new and useful to the proceeding (all the while staying well within the
boundaries of the issues at hand); or (2) the Court allows a good deal of
leeway when enforcing the rules in practice.
There is reason to believe (2) provides a much better explanation for
the Court’s behaviour than (1). Notwithstanding the intuitive plausibility
of Brodie’s claim about the resources available to modern courts, when
we turn to the cases themselves—in particular, to the similarities that
exist between intervening submissions in highly represented cases—the
point becomes compelling. Take, for instance, the factums prepared by the
Shibogama First Nations Council, the Central Coast Indigenous Reserve
Alliance, and the Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council in Ktunaxa Nation
v British Columbia92—a case about indigenous land use rights for spiritual
87. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, r 57(1).
88. Ibid at r 57(2)
89. Ibid at r 59.
90. Ibid at r 42.
91. Brodie, supra note 5 at 53. “Parties” can include both litigating parties as well as the services of
a reasonable competent bar and clerks (ibid at 61).
92. Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017
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purposes. Each of these factums was organized around the importance
that non-traditional sacred spaces play in the robust enjoyment of one’s
religious practice, and ultimately advanced the position that section 2(a)
of the Charter should be read in that light. Similarly in Carter v Canada,93
where a challenge was issued to Canada’s criminal prohibition against
assisted dying, the factums prepared by the Catholic Health Alliance, the
Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada, and the Catholic Civil
Rights League all focused on the legal claim that a decision to invalidate the
prohibition would trench on the protected rights of faith-based healthcare
providers. The same trend is repeated in Loyola High School v Quebec,94
Google v Equustek Solutions,95 British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v
British Columbia,96 and in a number of other high-prole cases. In each
instance, trying to discern how the arguments presented by certain factums
differed in any signicant sense from those presented by others would be
an exercise in mental gymnastics—and this is to say nothing of whether
they introduced perspectives or points of law not already represented by
either party to the case.
The overlap featured in these and other cases invites us to ask the
following question: why does the Court continue to operate under the
strict formal conditions it does when in practice they seem only nominally
relevant to its decision to grant leave? I believe the democratic balancing
interpretation offers an especially good explanation. Retaining rules
that are formally strict enough should the practice of intervention begin
to compromise the procedural values lying at the core of the judicial
institution has given the Court license to adopt a strikingly liberal approach
to how those rules are applied. This in turn allows the Court to pay heed to
different rationales for granting participatory leave depending on the type
of fact pattern or situation on appeal, as well as the implications it believes
its decision will have for society. It may be the case, for instance, that, as
Alarie and Green posit, the Court considers an intervening submission
valuable because it increases the likelihood that a judgment will better

SCC 54.
93. Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5.
94. Loyola High School v Quebec (AG), 2015 SCC 12. Among others, there was signicant overlap
in the factums prepared by the Christian Legal Fellowship, the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, the
Catholic Civil Rights League, the Canadian Council of Christian Charities.
95. Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34. There was signicant overlap in the factums
prepared by the Wikimedia Foundation, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, OpenMedia Engagement
Network, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
96. British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia, 2016 SCC 49. There was signicant
overlap in the factums prepared by the Coalition of Ontario Teacher Afliates, the Public Service
Alliance of Canada, and the Canadian Labour Congress.
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reect the relevant legal principles. This might arise when the Court
believes it could use assistance in making sense of highly technical fact
patterns, as may be the case in disputes over intellectual property, data
security, and the like. Alternatively, and harkening to earlier literature on
the subject, it may grant leave simply because it believes there is an allthings-considered democratic benet to doing so. We witness a perfect
example of this latter rationale in the Court’s recent decision to reverse
Wagner J’s order to deny leave to a number of LGBTQ groups in a pair of
Trinity Western cases that touched on the issue of sexual-orientation-based
discrimination.97 Although Wagner J went on record to conrm that he
“was convinced that some intervenors for which I accepted the application
in fact will convey the interests, preoccupations and concerns of members
of the LGBTQ,” after discussing the issue with then Chief Justice Beverly
McLachlin, the Court “decided that it would be best to add another day,
and have all the applications granted.”98
If we were to assess this reversal against the strategic narrative
proposed by Brodie, we would likely regard the move as more evidence
that the Court uses intervention as a means to promote its own institutional
legitimacy. But for the reasons already expressed, this seems an unlikely
explanation for the Court’s behaviour. The alternative I have proposed
suggests Wagner J’s reversal is instead an acknowledgment that in this
particular instance the initial decision failed to strike a suitable balance
between the democratic value of granting participatory leave versus the
cost to other relevant values that would be suffered on the basis of not
doing so. Or to put the point slightly differently, even though the LGBTQ
groups in question did not meet the formal criteria set out by the Court
with respect to obtaining intervenor status, the fact that their participation
would not have unduly affected the Court’s impartial judgement, nor have
been an excessive strain on the Court’s effective operation, meant that the
balance of democratic values was in this case best struck on the side of
allowing participation.
The democratic balancing interpretation I have proposed is
fundamentally grounded on the value inherent to participation itself, and
it vindicates early arguments that called for just this kind of approach to
intervention. It also impugns how that value is represented in the two
97. The cases in question are Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018
SCC 32; and Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33. The order to
deny leave was issued on 27 July 2017.
98. Sean Fine, “Supreme Court justice offers explanation for LGBTQ decision,” The Globe and
Mail (2 August 2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/supreme-court-justiceoffers-explanation-for-lgbtq-decision/article35870614/> [perma.cc/N4UN-E295].
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later works on the practice. Consider, for instance, how Alarie and Green
represent the value of participation. Although the authors recognize
that judges may “wish to allow intervenors, even if they add no useful
information, if they believe there is a need to ensure that whatever the
‘correct’ answer is, it requires that the parties feel it is legitimate,” they
also assert that, “[this kind of] explanation seems to accord most closely
with a strategic view of judicial behavior [whereby] judges make decisions
(including whether to allow outside parties to intervene) in order to further
their policy preferences...”99 In other words, to Alarie and Green, the notion
that the Court may grant intervenor status on any basis other than a belief
that the submissions will help to bring about a more accurate decision
collapses into the kind of strategic narrative advanced by Brodie. But for
the reasons I have outlined, there is no reason to think that such a conation
is necessary. Rather than viewing participation through the skeptical lens
that both Alarie and Green and Brodie employ, we may interpret it instead
as a nod to the democratic value earlier writers on intervention considered
so compelling. Philip Bryden’s view reects the importance those authors
placed on participation:
...the willingness of courts to listen to intervenors is a reection of the
value that judges attach to people. Our commitment to a right to hearing
and public participation in governmental decision-making is derived not
only from the belief that we improve the accuracy of decisions when we
allow people to present their side of the story, but also from our sense that
participation is necessary to preserve human dignity and self-respect.100

Bryden makes two points in this passage, and both are vital to a nonstrategic way of viewing the participatory role intervenors may play in
a court proceeding. The rst and more obvious is to draw attention to
the inherent value in the act of participating itself—a value that extends
beyond any instrumental or strategic ends that might be served by such
participation. The second and more crucial point is that the reason judges
might allow intervenor participation in the rst place is precisely because
they acknowledge the normative signicance of this value. This shifts
the focus away from the kind of strategic motivation Alarie and Green
attach to the rationale toward a normative grounding for it. Why would
the SCC allow intervenor participation even in circumstances where such
participation is likely to have little to no effect over the ultimate decision
it will render? It is not necessarily to ensure that intervening parties will

99. Alarie, supra note 1 at 391.
100. Bryden, supra note 7 at 509.
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“‘buy into’ a particular decision,”101 nor even “to increase the sense of the
legitimacy of the process as a whole,”102 but because the Court has itself
“bought into” the argument that there is inherent value to allowing such
participation to proceed.
In this respect, there are both normative and descriptive reasons to
believe that the Court might defer to the kind of participatory argument
made by early writers when deciding whether to allow an intervention
to proceed. But this is only one side of the coin. On the other side, and
as I explained above, considerations exist that could serve to undermine
the democratic standing of the Court—whether it be the Court’s efcient
operation, its accountability to the public, or a mixture of both. The crux
of the analysis I have provided is that if the Court is condent that the
values that stand to be compromised through the participation of outside
parties are relatively safeguarded—a condence I have suggested is rst
and foremost secured by the strict formal conditions pertaining to the
practice—it may at that point turn its attention to other values that may be
at stake, the most signicant of which seems to be the value in participation
itself. This is the essence of the democratic balancing interpretation I have
defended in this paper and, if correct, it is an important consideration
toward fully understanding the Court’s approach to intervention.
Conclusion
My argument in this paper defends the SCC’s approach to intervention.
The crux of the argument I have advanced is that the Court’s approach
to intervention allows it to strike a reasonable balance among competing
democratic considerations, none of which are automatically more valuable
than any other in the context of judicial decision-making. Although I
make no denitive claims about the accuracy of my account, it is one
that is both normatively attractive and able to explain the historical record
of granting interventions at the Supreme Court. The Court should be
commended for identifying a way to liberalize a practice that possesses
many democratically-attractive features but also the inherent capacity to
undermine the democratic standing of the Court.
A recent statement issued by the Supreme Court lends weight to my
interpretation of the Court’s policy on intervention. In a Notice to the
Profession issued in March 2017, the Court made clear that “the purpose
of an intervention is to provide relevant submissions that will be useful to
the Court and different from those of the other parties. Intervenors shall
101. Alarie, supra note 1 at 389.
102. Ibid.
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not make any statement with respect to the outcome of the appeal in their
factum”103—which was a not-so-subtle reminder of the rules that had been
in effect for decades. In addition to this, two minor adjustments were
announced concerning those rules, both of which addressed time sensitive
aspects of the practice.104
To understand what may have caused the Court to make these
adjustments, it is important to note that nine months prior a decision was
rendered in the R v Jordan appeal, a case that focused specically on the
right to due process and the responsibility of the courts to ensure that
justice is carried out in a timely and efcient manner. In its judgment in
that appeal, the SCC declared that the (criminal) justice system in Canada
had “come to tolerate excessive delays,” which, it said, could be attributed
to a “culture of complacency.”105 Remedial actions were taken and the
Court created a new framework to judge whether a citizen’s due process
rights had been infringed or denied, imposing a presumptive ceiling on
how long the state had to bring an accused person to trial (18 months for
trials going to a provincial court; 30 months for trials going to a superior
court).106 This in turn caused some uncertainty within the bar as to what
those limits would mean for the proper dispensation of justice.107
It is of course possible to read the dovetailing of the Jordan decision
with the Court’s opting to adjust various aspects of its procedural
guidelines as a simple coincidence. But this is unlikely. The more
plausible explanation suggests that Jordan was a salient indicator that
the efcient administration of justice in Canada was under siege, and
that modications to the processes by which courts operate would likely
have to be put to effect. Chief Justice McLachlin suggested as much in a
speech delivered just after Jordan was released, her claim being that by
“improving and coordinating the administration of justice” the “serious
problem that imperils the public’s condence in the justice system” could
be mitigated.108
103. Notice to Profession, supra note 4.
104. The rst was a reduction in time allotted to intervenors for making an oral argument (ibid); and
the second a reduction in time to le an intervening factum (Supreme Court of Canada, “Guide to the
2017 Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada” (2017), online: Supreme Court of
Canada <web.archive.org/web/20171212191039/https://www.scc-csc.ca/ar-lr/amend-modif2017-0101-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/UC3G-D3AY] [2017 Guide].
105. R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at para 4 [Jordan].
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107. Maxime Charron-Tousignant, “Unreasonable Delays in Criminal Trials: the Impact of the Jordan
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The Court may therefore be understood to have recognized that the
problem of the efcient administration of justice has come to a boil. Its latest
changes to the intervention procedure address that mechanism to ensure it
does not exacerbate administrative inefciency and delay. And while the
target of this effort has by no means been limited to intervention,109 for the
reasons mentioned earlier, it would surely be considered one of the marks.
In this respect, a gentle reminder to the profession about the rules around
intervention, as well as a slight adjustment to the time-related elements
of those rules, play some part toward rebalancing a scale the Court may
believe is out of alignment. If the analysis I provide in this paper is an
accurate rendering of the Court’s behaviour, these recent actions should
not be read as a change of course concerning the Court’s fuller approach
to intervention, but rather as a perfectly predictable—and normatively
tting—instantiation of it.

juges/spe-dis/bm-2016-08-11-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/BV5X-JH8C].
109. 2017 Guide, supra note 104.

